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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Scope
This memorandum addresses the practices and policies with regard to providing

witnesses copies of their statements in international tribunal and national jurisdictions as well.*
There is no statute in any of the international tribunals directly addressing how or whether
witnesses can obtain copies of their statements. However, the ad-hoc tribunals have allowed
witnesses in certain cases to see or obtain copies of their statements through a practice known as
“witness proofing.” Approaches to the issue divide broadly between civil law and common law
traditions.
In general, common-law-based tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) allow witnesses to obtain copies of their statements through
“witness proofing,” while more civil-law tribunals such as the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) resist this practice. The
approach is also different among national jurisdictions, as some countries have statutes dealing
with this issue, and other countries decide this issue on a case-by-case basis.
The first part of this memorandum defines “witness proofing” and its use in international
tribunals, as well as how it has been applied in cases. Next, the memorandum discusses some
blanket policies that exist in these ad-hoc tribunals, and how national jurisdictions have handled
cases where witnesses have requested copies of their statements.

8

There is no universal definition of what constitutes witness statements. The Chambers in
the Special Court for Sierra Leone determined that nowhere in the ICC statutes is witness
statement defined.1 However, it is worth noting that the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia has conceded the usual meaning to be ascribed to witness statements is an
account of a person’s knowledge of a crime which is recorded through due procedure in the
course of an investigation into the crime.2 The ad-hoc tribunals have also considered that
transcribed testimony, radio interviews, unsigned witness declarations, and records of question
put to witnesses and answers given, constitute witness statements.3
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. “Witness proofing” promotes efficiency by allowing orientation and
memory-refreshing while guarding against “coaching.”
Since most international tribunals do not have statutes addressing the issue of providing
witnesses with copies of their statements, the common practice as developed in Prosecutor v.
Limaj, Bala and Musliu, has been “witness proofing.” The ICC in Lubanga described “witness
proofing” as having two different components. The first component is a familiarization process
whereby, the Prosecutor can show the witness the courtroom and describe the other participants
and their roles (for example, the defense lawyers, the judges, the victim representatives);
introduce the witness to the lawyer who will take him through his testimony; talk about security

* What is the practice/policy at the international tribunals with regard to providing witnesses
copies of their statements? Do international tribunals have blanket policies, or is it on a case-bycase basis (e.g., if the witness asks for it)? What is the practice in National Jurisdictions?
1
Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PTE (May 31, 2004).
2
Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Joki, Case No. IT-02-60-T, T. 8172–8173 (26 April 2004)
(Defence counsel describing to the Trial Chamber that proofing notes were provided to the
Prosecution); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42- T, T. 8058, 8065 (16 July 2004) (Trial
Chamber describing problems arising at trial due to inadequate witness.
3
Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera, [Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Regarding Witness Proofing] Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.8, 11 May 2007.
9

and safety issues; remind the witness of his oath to tell the truth; and explain the process (for
example, that the prosecutor will examine the witness to bring out his testimony; the defense
lawyers will then cross-examine the witness and then the prosecutor has an opportunity to reexamine him again).4 This first component of witness proofing is allowed in the ICC.
The second component of “proofing” focuses on adequate preparation to ensure that the
witness’s testimony at trial is accurate. This directly deals with the issue we have at hand. It
allows the witness to obtain copies of any prior statements they had given to the investigators to
refresh their memories. It would also allow the Prosecutor to go through the questions that he or
she would ask the witness during the testimony; and to ask the witness about any other
information that could potentially help show the guilt or innocence of the person on trial.5 This
second component is not allowed in the ICC.6
2. Although Tribunal Statutes are silent on this issue, “witness proofing” is
an accepted practice in common-law-leaning courts but less so in civil law
courts.
The statute of the ICTY is silent on how witnesses could obtain copies of their
statements. Nevertheless, it appears to have been common practice at the ICTY from its earliest
days that witnesses could obtain copies of their statements through a practice called “witness
proofing”. Like the ICTY, the ICTR’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence are both
silent on how witnesses can request copies of their statements. Nevertheless, the practice of

4

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, [Decision Regarding the Practices Used to
Prepare and Familiarize Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, 30, November 2007, ICC01/04-01/06-1049 (“Lubanga Trial Decision”), at para.53(f)]. [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 26].
5
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, [Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the
Practices of Witness Familiarization and Witness Proofing, 8 November 2006 (“Lubanga PreTrial Decision”)].
6
Ibid., at para. 42.
10

“witness proofing” appears to have been well accepted at the ICTR as well7. Like in the other adhoc tribunals, the SCSL’s Statute is silent on providing witnesses with copies of their statements.
However, witnesses have been able to see copies of their statements just like in the ICTY and
ICTR through “witness proofing”.8
Although all witnesses when necessary have been able to obtain copies of their statements in
the ad-hoc tribunals through “witness proofing”, the ICC on the other hand, has limited such
practices to expert witnesses.9

3. Concern about “witness coaching” may lead courts and parties to limit
“witness proofing.”
Although witness proofing is widely accepted in the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, there has
been great objection to its use when opposing counsel have suspected that this approach involved
“witness coaching.” In Prosecutor v. Limaj, the three defendants asked the Trial Chamber to
order that the Prosecution immediately cease proofing its witnesses or, in the alternative, that a
Defence representative be permitted to attend the Prosecution’s proofing sessions or that the
Defence be provided with a video or tape-recording of the proofing sessions.10 The request
originated in the context of a specific late disclosure dispute surrounding a missing photographic
line-up previously shown to a Prosecution witness. As a general matter, the Defence asserted that
the numerous proofing sessions conducted by the Prosecution in that case were more properly
characterized as coaching, rather than proofing, and that the sessions usurped the role of the

7

Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, 7 July 2006
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on the Gbao and
Sesay Joint Application for the Exclusion of the Testimony of Witness TF1-141 (“First Sesay
Trial Decision”), 26 October 2005.
9
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the
Practices of Witness
10
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T (“Limaj” or “the Limaj Case”).
Limaj Trial Decision, at 1.
8
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ICTY’s Victims and Witnesses Section.11 Courts opposed to witness proofing have most often
compared the practice to witness coaching which is not an allowed practice in all courts.12
Witness coaching usually occurs in secrecy where witnesses are trained on what to say and not
what they know.13
4. The ICC does not allow witnesses to obtain copies of their statements.
Unlike in common law tribunals where witnesses can obtain copies of their statements
through the “memory-refreshing” component of proofing, there is no statute or practice in civillaw courts allowing witnesses to request copies of their statements. In a famous ICC case,
Lubanga, the Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s argument that proofing was provided for
in the Rome Statute.14 The Chamber argued that proofing a witness prior to trial might diminish
the “spontaneous nature of testimony” which could be of “paramount importance to the Court’s
ability to find the truth.”15
5. ECCC Internal Rule 86 allows access to court files.
Although civil-law tribunals do not allow witnesses to obtain copies of their statements,
Rule 86 of the ECCC Internal rules clearly states that; at all times, the Co-Prosecutors and the
lawyers for the other parties shall have the right to examine and obtain copies of the case file,
under supervision of the Greffier of the Chamber, during working days and subject to the

11

Limaj Trial Decision, at 2.
Id.
13
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=129291
14
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the
Practices of Witness Familiarization and Witness Proofing, 8 November 2006 (“Lubanga PreTrial Decision”).
15
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to
Prepare and Familiarize Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, 30, November 2007, ICC01/04-01/06-1049 (“Lubanga Trial Decision”), at para.53(f).
12
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requirements of the proper functioning of the ECCC.16 However, the ECCC appears to follow the
civil law practice and forbids any proofing of witnesses, although the issue has not yet been
argued before the Court.17
6. In common-law national jurisdictions, witnesses are allowed to see copies
of their statements for the purpose of “refreshing memory.”
The approach of witnesses obtaining copies of their statements in national jurisdiction
varies from one country to another. The general practice in common-law national jurisdictions is
that witnesses may request copies of their statements in order to help refresh their memories. In
the United Kingdom for example, there is no general rule that witnesses cannot, before a trial,
see their statements.18 U.K. courts have held that it is always desirable for witnessed to see
copies of their statements before a trial.19 Unlike the U.K. practice, the U.S. approach has been
on a case-by-case basis. States have followed the Fed. R. Evid. 803(5) which clearly states that, a
memorandum or record “concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but
now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately" is
admissible.20
II.

Factual Background
Rafik Hariri was a prominent businessman and prime minister of Lebanon from 1992 to

1998, and again from 2000 until his resignation in 2004.21 He was assassinated on 14 February
2005 when explosives were detonated as his motorcade drove past the St. George Hotel in the
Lebanese capital, Beirut. The assassination of Prime Minister Harriri led to the creation of the
16

Internal Rules of the ECCC, Rule 86 As Revised on 9 February 2010.
http://www.lubangatrial.org/2009/02/10/when-witnesses-change-their-stories.
18
In R v Richardson (D) [1971] 2 Q.B. 484, 55 Cr. App. R. 244.
19
Worley v Bentley (1976) 62 Cr App R 239.
20
USCS Fed Rules Evid R 803.
21
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafic_Hariri.
17
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Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the investigation by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon into his
assassination is still ongoing.22
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is an international criminal tribunal for the prosecution,
under international law, of criminal acts relating to the assassination of Rafik Hariri on February.
The tribunal officially opened on 1 March 2009. There is no timeline on the judicial work and
the tribunal could be operational through 2014 and beyond depending on the scope of the
investigation.
The time lapse between the assassination and the trial may make access to earlier statements
important for memory refreshing. If used properly, witness proofing can benefit judicial
efficiency. The fact that it is widely recognized in the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL is revelatory of its
usefulness. However, this approach will likely face objections if introduced without provision for
guarding against witness coaching. It should be noted that there is a great distinction between
witness proofing and witness coaching. A “witness proofing” process focuses on adequate
preparation to ensure that the witness’s testimony at trial is accurate.23 It allows the witness to

22

http://www.stl-tsl.org/action/home. "On 13 December 2005, the Government of the Republic
of Lebanon requested the United Nations to establish a tribunal of an international character to
try all those who are alleged responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 in Beirut that killed
the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others. Pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1664 (2006), the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic negotiated an agreement
on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Further to Security Council resolution
1757(2007) of 30 May 2007, the provisions of the document annexed to it and the Statute of the
Special Tribunal there to attached, entered into force on 10 June 2007. "
23

Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera, Decision on Defence Motions to Prohibit
Witness Proofing: Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 15
December 2006 (“Karemera Trial Decision”), at 5 (describing that proofing has been recognized
in the ICTR’s jurisprudence in relation to how the content of an interview with a witness is to be
disclosed, and noting the Prosecution’s practice of disclosing ‘will-say’ or ‘reconfirmation
statements prior the testimony of a witness).
14

read any prior statements they had given to the investigators to refresh their memories. It would
also allow the Prosecutor to go through the questions that he or she would ask the witness during
the testimony; and to ask the witness about any other information that could potentially help
show the guilt or innocence of the person on trial.24 Common-law ad-hoc tribunals provide that
proofing sessions are open.25In those jurisdictions which permit or encourage such proofing,
counsel is expected to operate in good faith, on the assumption that the testimony of a wellprepared witness assists in the truth-seeking process.26
In contrast, in witness coaching the witnesses are prepared by lawyers in private, no
records are kept, and the participants do not openly discuss the encounter.27 If false or misleading
testimony results, the only persons who know about it are the participants themselves, and the
capacity of cross examination to expose improper coaching is extremely limited.28 To be sure,
any efforts to “coach” a witness by telling him what to say are improper, and are forbidden in all
jurisdictions.29 The evidence should be what the witness recalls, not what he is told to recall.
Since the events of the Harriri assassination are several years old, need to refresh witness’
memory may be an important problem for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
III.

The Legal Elements of Providing Witnesses with copies of their Statements
a. Witnesses are allowed to obtain copies through “witness proofing” in the ICTY,
ICTR and SCSL
i. Limaj Case, ICTY 2004

24

Ibid., at para. 15.
http://iwpr.net/report-news/lawyers-divided-over-icc-witness-preparation
26
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber I, Prosecution’s
submissions regarding the subjects that require early determination: procedures to be adopted for
instructing expert witnesses, witness familiarization and witness proofing, 12 September 2007.
27
Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 23, 2002.
28
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292918
29
Journal Record, The (Oklahoma City), Feb 5, 1998 by Joseph Menn Bloomberg News
25
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One of the first cases in the ICTY to discuss the issue of “witness proofing” was the 2004
case of Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu.30 In Limaj, the three accused had been indicted for
committing crimes against Serbian civilians and Kosovo Albanian civilians.31 In November
2004, all three accused in the case asked the Trial Chamber to order that the Prosecution
immediately cease proofing its witnesses or, in the alternative, that a Defence representative be
permitted to attend the Prosecution’s proofing sessions or that the Defence be provided with a
video or tape-recording of the proofing sessions.32 The request originated in the context of a
specific late disclosure dispute surrounding a missing photographic line-up previously shown to
a Prosecution witness.33
As a general matter, however, the Defence asserted that the numerous proofing sessions
conducted by the Prosecution in that case were more properly characterized as coaching, rather
than proofing, and that the sessions usurped the role of the ICTY’s Victims and Witnesses

30

See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, [Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution
Practice of ‘Proofing’ Witnesses, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 10 December 2004 (“Limaj Trial
Decision”), at 2 (“The practice of proofing witness, by both the Prosecution and Defence has
been in place and accepted since the inception of this Tribunal. It is certainly not unique to this
Chamber”). Records of various oral proceedings before the ICTY seem to bear this out. See e.g.
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Došen, and Kolundžija, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, T. 446 (8 February 2001)
(Trial Chamber encouraging proofing as “helpful for the Prosecution … helpful clearly for the
Defence to know the issues … and …helpful for the Trial Chamber”); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case
No. IT-97-24-T, T. 3568 (27 May 2002) (Trial Chamber thanking the Prosecution for the
provision of “the proofing notes”); Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Decision on Subject Matter of
Testimony of Witnesses on Appeal and Prosecution’s Request for Re-Consideration of
Scheduling Order for Evidentiary Hearing, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 8 December 2003, at 3
(Appeals Chamber noting the provision of “witness proofing summaries” by the Prosecution);
Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, T. 6022
31
Prosecutor v. Limaj et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-03-66-T, International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 30 November 2005].
32
Limaj Trial Decision, at 1.
33
See Limaj, at T. 1143–1170 (30 November 2004).
16

Section.34 In denying the defense’s request, the Trial Chamber noted “the practice of proofing
witnesses, by both the Prosecution and Defence, has been in place and accepted since the
inception of International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and so is not unique to this
Chamber, as well as it is a widespread practice in many other jurisdictions.”35
The Trial Chamber went further to agree with the Prosecution that the practice of
proofing provides a number of advantages to the judicial process.36 First, witnesses are assisted
in coping with the process of testifying. Second, proofing is directed to fully identifying all facts
known to the witness that are relevant to the actual charges at issue in the trial, ensuring that the
evidence presented at trial is more accurate and complete. Third, careful proofing can facilitate
the orderly and efficient presentation of the witness’s evidence at trial.37
ii. Milutinovic Case, ICTY 2003
In Milutinovic, the accused were senior Serbian officials who were charged with crimes
against humanity (deportation, forcible transfer, murder, and persecution) and war crimes
(murder) for acts allegedly committed in Kosovo during the first half of 1999.38 Arguing that
witnesses should not be allowed to obtain copies of their statements nor should witnesses be
exposed to any form of proofing, the Defence in the Milutonivic case asked the Chamber to

34

Limaj Trial Decision, at 3.[ It is noteworthy that the Defence did not claim that any such
coaching had actually occurred by the Prosecution. Rather, there was a danger that it might.
Ibid., at 1. Limaj, at T. 1161 (30 November 2004)].
35
Limaj Trial Decision, at 2.
36
Id.
37
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Došen, and Kolundžija, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, T. 446 (8 February 2001)
(Trial Chamber encouraging proofing as “helpful for the Prosecution … helpful clearly for the
Defence to know the issues … and …helpful for the Trial Chamber”)
38
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-PT.
17

prohibit the Prosecution from proofing its witnesses by citing the Lubanga decision.39The Trial
Chamber pointed out several procedural differences between the decision-making processes of
the Lubanga case and the Milutinovic case.40 It considered that the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber
addressed the practice of proofing in the context of a single witness set to testify at the pre-trial
confirmation hearing of the first accused before the Court, whereas the Milutinovic Chamber had
to consider the practice in the context of numerous witnesses who had or would testify in an
actual trial.41
Contrary to the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber, the Milutonovic Trial Chamber found that
proofing a witness regarding his/her evidence can in fact, enhance the fairness and
expeditiousness of the trial, provided that allowing witnesses to see their statements is a genuine
attempt to help refresh their memories.42
Finally, the court in Milutinovic concluded that proofing did not prejudice the rights of
the accused, and Defence allegations that the prosecution had or would violate the “clear
standards of professional conduct which apply…when proofing witnesses” were dismissed.43
iii. Sesay Case, SCSL 2006
In the Sesay case, five former leaders of the former Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone were indicted on 18 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious

Prosecutor v. Milutinovic,et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T (“Milutinovic or “the Milutinovic
Case”). Milutinovic Trial Decision, at para. 11-15.
40
Ibid., at para 8.
41
Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Ojdanic Motion to
Prohibit Witness Proofing, 12 December 2006 (“Milutinovic Trial Decision”), at p. 2. The
defense motion was filed on 15 November 2006.
42
Ibid., at para 15.
43
Ibid., at para 8.
39
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violations of international humanitarian law.44 Two of the accused asked the Chamber to exclude
the evidence of a witness who had previously testified at trial.45 They claimed that the
Prosecution had knowingly or negligently destroyed handwritten notes from a proofing session,
violating a previous ruling of the chamber and that46 therefore, these witnesses must not be
allowed to go through proofing nor witnesses be allowed to see any copies of their statements.47
The trial chamber noted that the purpose of proofing was “for counsel to discuss matters,
including the witness’ proposed evidence, with the witness who has little experience appearing in
court.”48 The chamber quoted the ICTY’s Limaj Trial Decision, and held that proofing witnesses
prior to their testimony in court is a legitimate practice that serves the interests of justice.49 This
is especially so given the particular circumstances of many of the witnesses in this trial who are
testifying about traumatic events in an environment that can be entirely foreign and intimidating
for them.50 Therefore it was important that witnesses obtain copies of their statements through
proofing to help them overcome such conditions.

44

Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (the RUF accused)
(Appeal judgment), Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 26 October 2009.
45
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on the Gbao and
Sesay Joint Application for the Exclusion of the Testimony of Witness TF1-141 (“First Sesay
Trial Decision”), 26 October 2005.
46
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Defence Motion
to Request the Trial Chamber to Rule that the Prosecution Moulding of Evidence is
Impermissible (“Second Sesay Trial Decision”), 1 August 2006, para. 10.
47
Ibid., at para. 11.
48
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Defence Motion
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iii. Karemera Case, ICTR 2005
In the Karemera case, Karemera and Nzirorera, two government officials accused
alongside Ngirumpatse were charged with conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide.51 The
accused in the Karemera case cited Lubanga in trying to prohibit the prosecution from obtaining
copies of witnesses’ statements through proofing.52 As in in the decisions in the other tribunals,
the Trial Chamber carefully considered the Lubanga Pre-Trial Decision and the practice of
proofing at the ICTR and the ICTY, and noted that the Milutinovic Trial Decision, filed just three
days before, had held that proofing “not only poses no undue prejudice, but is also a useful and
permissible practice.53
The chamber acknowledged that some witness statements may not be complete and that it
is common for witnesses to subsequently recall and add details to those statements. In addition,
the Chamber determined that proofing could not be considered “as permission to train, coach or
tamper with a witness before he or she gives evidence.”54
The Chamber further stated that proofing does not amount to the manipulation of a
witness’ evidence, but that this practice may encompass preparing and familiarizing a witness
with the proceedings before the Tribunal, comparing prior statements made by a witness,
detecting differences and inconsistencies in recollection of the witness and allowing a witness to
refresh his or her memory in respect of the evidence he or she will give.55 The Chamber noted
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that there are clear standards of professional conduct and ethics which apply to Prosecuting
Counsel when conducting interviews.56
iv.. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi Case, ICTR
In the Gacumbitsi case, the accused, Sylvestre Gacumbitsi a bourgmestre of Rusumo
commune was indicted for genocide, conspiracy to genocide and crimes against humanity. The
accused on appeal, challenged the Trial Chamber’s decision to credit a particular witness’s
testimony based on assertions that the witness had been “coached” by the Prosecution.57 In
rejecting this argument, the Appeals Chamber stated that “the passage of Witness TBH’s
testimony concerning the alleged prosecutorial coaching demonstrates no impropriety.”58
The Appeals Chamber added that it saw no reason to doubt the Prosecution’s statement
that the witness was involved in normal preparation to give evidence, and nothing more.59 The
Appeals Chamber then concluded that it is not inappropriate per se for the parties to discuss the
content of testimony and witness statements with their witnesses, unless they attempt to
influence that content in ways that shade or distort the truth.60 The Appeals Chamber went
further to state that the Trial Chamber’s definition of witness proofing was consistent with the
practice in other ad-hoc Tribunal, citing the Limaj case.61
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b. The Contrasting Approach of the ICC
i. Lubanga Pre-Trial 2007
Unlike in the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in the case of
Prosecutor v. Lubanga argued that “proofing of a witness” was not found in the Statute, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, or Regulations of the ICC. 62 The Chamber differentiated proofing into
two broad components. The first, “familiarization” component concerned witness preparation for
the process of giving oral testimony and witness familiarization with the proceedings.63 The
second, “evidentiary review” component concerned witness proofing in the sense of the
Prosecution 1) allowing a witness to read his or her statement(s) and refresh his or her memory
in respect of the evidence to be given at trial, 2) relying on the statement(s) to put questions to
the witness which are intended to be asked at trial and in the order they are to be asked, and 3)
inquiring of the witness about possible additional information of an exculpatory nature.64 The
‘familiarization’ component was found to be admissible if conducted by the Victims and
Witnesses Unit rather than the prosecution, but the ‘evidentiary review’ component was found
inadmissible and prohibited.65
In concluding that “evidentiary review” proofing was not appropriate, the Pre-Trial
Chamber reasoned that the only relevant case advanced by the Prosecution to support the
practice was the Limaj case…. a case which in the Chamber’s view actually disproved the
Prosecution’s submission that proofing was a “widely accepted practice in international criminal
62
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law.”66 The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s proposition that the nature of the
crimes tried at the ICC or the fact that they had occurred long ago supported the practice of
proofing, noting that “national jurisdictions, such as Spain, Belgium or Germany” had not
decided to adopt the practice of proofing when implementing the Rome Statute in national
legislation.67
ii. The ECC Approach
Although there are no known cases addressing the issue of how witnesses can obtain
copies of their statements in the ECCC, the Internal Rules of the ECCC is not silent on this issue.
Rule 86 of the ECCC Rules of Evidence do allow witnesses through the prosecutor or Defence
Counsel to request court files.68 However, the rule clearly states that the request can only be
granted under the supervision of a Greffier. It should be noted that the ECCC, even though a
civil-law tribunal, do allow witnesses access to court files.
c. Practice in Common-Law National Jurisdictions
i. United States
The U.S., like other common-law countries does allow witnesses to obtain copies of their
statement for the primary purpose of refreshing their memories. Although the practice in the U.S.
is on a case-by-case basis, most states have followed the Federal Rules of Evidence 612 and 803
(5) in addressing this issue. In addition to that, Circuit courts in Grand Jury cases have allowed
witnesses to obtain their statements if they show that a “particularized need” exists for the
statement which outweighs the policy of secrecy in grand jury proceedings.69
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a. In the Case of a Grand Jury (ALL Circuit Courts)
In U.S. Federal Grand Jury cases, witness requests to obtain transcripts of their own prior
testimony have generally been denied by the courts.70 A good example is in Bast v United States,
a case that presents the question of whether Richard L. Bast, a witness before a federal grand
jury, should be furnished with a copy of his testimony. The district court declined to grant his
request, arguing that Bast's claim that he is entitled to his testimony merely since it was recorded
is without merit because he has no absolute right to it absent a particularized need.71
The court went further to argue that although disclosure is wholly proper where the ends
of justice require it, the burden remains on the person seeking disclosure to show that a
"particularized need" exists for the statements which outweighs the policy of secrecy of grand
jury proceedings.72 In a divided panel decision the Seventh Circuit held that grand jury witnesses
may not obtain copies of the transcripts of their own testimony.73
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bursey, a case involving the
Black Panther Party in which the federal government conducted a grand jury investigation
regarding statements made by the Party chief of staff threatening national security, the court
permitted a witness to examine his prior testimony finding it unfair that grand jury and
prosecutor could review witness’ prior testimony but the witness could not.74
More so, in In re Sealed Motion, a case where a witness had been called in an
investigation of a government official by the independent counsel, the witness requested and
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received a copy of the transcript from the proceedings, and the independent counsel objected to
contending that the witness had no right to his testimony and had to comply with Fed. R. Crim.
P. (6)(e)(3)(C). The court held that the grand jury witness was entitled to a copy of his testimony
since no indictment was returned and the final report had been filed.75
Although most Circuit courts have dealt with cases regarding this issue, the Third Circuit
has not directly ruled upon the exact issue, except in a non-precedential factual situation in
United States v. Rose, a case where the defendant was convicted of perjury in an investigation of
alleged fraud against the United States in the operation of training schools for veterans.76 In
summary, until now the right of a witness to obtain the transcript of his or her prior grand jury
testimony has been very doubtful.
According to Rule 6(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which governs
disclosure of federal grand jury materials, unless the court orders otherwise, an attorney for the
government will retain control of the recording of the grand jury proceedings, the reporter's
notes, and any transcript prepared from those notes.77Therefore a court is authorized under Rule
6(e)(3)(E)(i) to decide whether to disclose grand jury materials, subject to any conditions that it
deems appropriate. These rules provide courts with authority but no guidance as to what
circumstances warrant disclosure.78
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In re Grand Jury, 609 F. Supp. 2d 153 , the 1st Circuit held as a matter of first impression
that a non-defendant grand jury witness may review a transcript of his prior grand jury testimony
if he can show a "particularized need" for viewing the transcript.79 In this case, a witness testified
to a jury for one full day concerning complex and highly technical issues that occurred almost 10
years earlier. While questioning the witness, three prosecutors in various ways expressed their
frustration with his answers and threatened him with possible perjury prosecution, going so far as
to ask whether the witness could speak or understand English.80
When proceedings were continued, the witness asked the District Court if he could
review a transcript of his prior testimony before being recalled.81 The court refused, noting that
the leading 1st Circuit cases required a particularized showing of need, which the witness could
not demonstrate. The witness refused to answer questions at his next appearance before the grand
jury, and the government sought to hold him in civil contempt.82
In another famous Grand Jury case, the 1st Circuit closely examined a holding from the
D.C. Circuit, which granted a non-target witness access to his grand jury transcript.83 The case
involved grand jury subpoenas for two corporate employees who were recalled to testify before a
grand jury, one for a second time, the other for a fourth time. Both made requests to the district
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court to review a transcript of their prior testimony. Both applications were denied and both
appealed. 84
Aside from the obvious advantage of being able to prepare for his or her second grand
jury appearance, the court noted that a grand jury witness needed to use the prior transcripts to
avoid being charged with making false declarations in violation of 18 USC 1623(a) for making
two materially inconsistent statements in his or her testimony.85 The court also noted that a
witness is permitted to recant prior grand jury testimony without legal penalty pursuant to 18
USC 1623(d), but would have difficulty doing so without the aid of the prior transcript.86
After weighing the interests of the witness and the government, the Court held that the
witness was entitled to review the transcripts of his or her prior testimony in the privacy of the
United States Attorney’s Office or some other secure private location.87This practice is similar to
Rule 86 of the ECCC Internal Rules where a witness is allowed access to court files under the
supervision of a greffier.88 The court reasoned that even if an interested third party confronted
the witness with questions about the substance of his or her testimony, the witness’ response
would not change if the witness had simply reviewed his or her testimony in private.89 However,
the court specifically did not rule on whether the witness was entitled to a copy of the transcript,
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but read in the context of the opinion, it is unlikely that a copy would be supplied to a witness.90
The court left to the discretion of the district court whether to allow the witnesses’ attorneys to
accompany them, or whether the witness or the attorneys could take notes.91
The 1st Circuit panel distinguished the case before it from all prior 1st Circuit cases
involving grand jury transcript requests, which all involved requests for physical copies of, not
mere access to, grand jury transcripts.92 For an authorized disclosure of grand jury material, a
threshold requirement is that the disclosure must be “preliminary to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding”. Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. A disclosure to a
witness of his or her prior grand jury testimony to prepare for a subsequent grand jury
appearance would be in connection with a judicial proceeding. …“It is well settled that a grand
jury hearing is a judicial proceeding within the scope of Rule 6(e)…” and Rule 6(e)… “ may
support disclosure in connection with the grand jury’s own proceedings.”93
As seen in the above cases, the concerns of the U.S. Federal Grand Jury cases are similar
to those in international tribunals. The DC Circuit’s 2007 decision suggests a procedure similar
to that of the ECCC Internal Rules (Rule 86).
b. State Grand Jury
In Colorado, § 16-5-204(4)(h) requires that the prosecution provide subpoenaed
witnesses with copies of statements attributed to them prior to testifying. The language of this
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subsection is clear: any witness who is required to appear before the grand jury has the right to
examine any statement the prosecution possesses which is attributed to that witness.94
The Colorado General Assembly specifically enacted §§ 16-5-204(4)(g) and (4)(h) to
prevent the prosecution from using witnesses' prior statements to ensnare them in a perjury
trap.95 By allowing witnesses to review their previous testimony and other statements in the
prosecution's possession, the General Assembly attempted to eliminate perjury traps and allow
witnesses the opportunity to exercise their right against self-incrimination.96
c. USC Title 18, Section 3500
In the United States, a witness can use a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of
testifying, but if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice, an
adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to crossexamine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the
testimony of the witness.97 If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the
subject matter of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any portions
not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto.98
Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made available to the
appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not produced or delivered pursuant to
order under this rule, the court shall make any order justice requires, except that in criminal cases
94
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when the prosecution elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the
court in its discretion determines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.99
d. Practice in Circuit and State Courts.
i. 6TH and 8th CIRCUITs
Like in other common-law courts, U.S. states have allowed witnesses to obtain copies of
their statements in order to help refresh their memory. In United States v. Bailey, witness
statements made during the FBI investigation were allowed to refresh a witness recollection.100
In this case, the government asked the witness who had accompanied him on various occasions
to check out homes that were potential burglary targets. When the witness could not recall, the
court allowed the government to refresh his recollection through use of the prior statement.101
The courts have held that where the statement is written by a third party and not the witness
himself, it can still be used to refresh recollection.102 In Bailey, the fact that the statement was
written by an FBI agent did not preclude its use to refresh recollection. This view was also
upheld in United States v. Boyd, a case where the defendant argued that the district court erred in
allowing a witness to testify while referring to a summary of his previous statement.103 The 8th
Circuit Court affirmed the ruling of the district court allowing the witness to see copies of his
statement to refresh his memory.
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a. ALABAMA
In Parker v. State, a case where the appellant argues that it was reversible error for the
court to permit the solicitor to cross-examine the defendant from a paper that purported to be a
written transcription of a tape recorded statement made by the defendant to police soon after the
fatal shooting, 104the court looked at several factors before making its decision. The Court looked
at whether the statement was written by the witness or was signed by the witness or it was prior
sworn testimony of the witness.105 The court then analyzed the three situations and decided that
if the statement is to be later introduced in evidence to impeach the witness, the statement must
be first shown to the witness in order to allow the witness to refresh his memory and to explain
any inconsistency.106
b. KANSAS
In State v. Kelly, Larry Stinson appeals from his jury trial convictions for one count each
of aggravated battery and aggravated robbery against Daniel Harris.107 In this case, the defendant
testified that he was with co-defendants but that he was not involved in the burglaries. A codefendant and a nightclub employee testified as to defendant's involvement.108 Defendant alleged
that the trial court erred in allowing the employee to refresh her recollection through a police
report that contained statements that the witness had given to the police shortly after the crimes.
The court argued that the issue whether the trial court should allow a witness to review a
document to refresh his or her memory does not depend solely upon who created the document.
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So long as the witness testifies from an independent recollection of the events at issue after the
document is used to refresh the witness' memory, it does not matter who created the document.
The Court stated that it is the witness' testimony, and not the document, which is the
evidence at issue.109 It went further to state that, prior to the court permitting admission of the
document itself into evidence as past recollection recorded, the court must first find that the
witness cannot recall the contents of the document but can attest that the document accurately
reflects his or her recollection at the time the document was created.110 Therefore, the court
decided that the trial court properly allowed the witness to refresh her recollection, and any
writing was permitted without restriction to authorship, provided the witness testified from an
independent recollection.111
c. OHIO
The practice of refreshing a witness' recollection by means of writing is prescribed by
Ohio R. Evid. 612, which echoes FRE 612. The rule clearly states that; if a witness uses a writing
to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying either: (1) while testifying; or (2) before
testifying, if a court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice, an
adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing.112
In City of Dayton v. Combs, a case in which there was a police raid at a gambling house
and the witnesses gave statements.113 At trial, the witnesses did not remember anything regarding
the gambling house. The witnesses silently read the statements and were questioned regarding
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their contents.114 Defendants claimed that the statements were improperly used. The Appeals
court held that the convictions were proper and the statements were admissible under Ohio R.
Evid. 803(5) because the witnesses did not remember the events, they made the statements when
they did remember the events, and they had sufficient indicia of reliability.115
The court went further to argue that prior written statements may be utilized during trial
testimony to either refresh a witness' recollection of events or information of which the witness
has no present recollection at trial or to impeach the testimony of a witness that is inconsistent
with his prior statement.116 The court agreed that use of prior statement during trial testimony is
permitted in the first instance to jog the memory of the witness and in the second instance to
indicate that the witness is untrustworthy. Thus, “if used solely to refresh recollection or to
impeach, the prior statement is of no substantive evidentiary value, and the hearsay rule and its
exceptions are not implicated.”117 If the statement is used to establish the truth of the matter
asserted, that is, as substantive evidence, with or without an additional purpose to impeach, the
hearsay rule and its exceptions are implicated.118
In addition, the court noted that it is at the discretion of the court to determine whether a
party may refresh the recollection of his own witness. However, the trial court may even permit
counsel to read aloud portions of the witness's statement in order to refresh recollection when the
witness repeatedly claims lack of memory.119 Once the trial court is satisfied that the witness has
no present recollection of the relevant information or events, the witness is permitted to read the
writing silently or have relevant portions thereof read to him. If his recollection has been revived,
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he may then continue with his testimony. The writing used to refresh the witness' recollection is
not admitted into evidence, unless admission is requested by the adverse party and in any event
has no substantive evidentiary significance.
Also, in State v. McLean, a witness, Vencius, repeatedly responded that he did not
remember what happened to numerous questions posed by the prosecutor.120 Therefore, the
prosecutor produced the sworn statement provided to the police by Vencius after the trial court
declared him a hostile witness.121 Vencius affirmed that the statement was his. Next, the
prosecutor read a series of sentences from the statement and repeatedly stopped and asked
whether the reading was correct.122 Under the authority of Stearns, Pace, and Evid.R. 612, the
prosecutor was permitted to produce such statement and read pertinent provisions aloud in order
that Vencius' recollection be refreshed. 123
Ohio R. Evid. 612 permit a party to use a writing to refresh a witness's recollection.
However, the party may not read the writing aloud, have the witness read it aloud, or otherwise
place it before the jury. Rather, the witness should read the writing silently in order to refresh his
or her recollection.124 If the writing refreshes the witness's recollection, the witness then testifies
using present independent knowledge. It is this testimony, not the writing that is the evidence.125
d. OREGON
Like in common-law jurisdictions, the state of Oregon allows witnesses to obtain copies
of their statements to help refresh their memories. Oregon Revised Statutes 45.580, provides
that: "A witness is allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact by anything written by
120
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himself, or under his direction, at the time when the fact occurred or immediately thereafter or at
any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that it was correctly stated in
the writing; but in either case the writing must be produced, and may be inspected by the adverse
party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and read it to the jury.126 The
Oregon statute allows a witness to testify from that writing, though the witness retains no
recollection of the particular facts. But it further states that the evidence shall be received with
caution.127
e. Washington DC
In the District of Columbia, the procedure for refreshing the recollection of a witness
with his or her prior testimony, or any other written statement, is that the examining attorney
must first establish that the witness' memory of the event is exhausted.128 In Wilkins v. United
States, a case where the defendant was charged with murder for the stabbing death of another
man who was alleged to be the ex-boyfriend of defendant’s girlfriend, the court held that the
statement should be shown to the witness, who should read it silently.129 The attorney should
next determine, by appropriate questions, whether reading the statement has actually refreshed
the witness' memory.130 If it has, then the witness may testify, independently of the statement, as
to his or her present recollection. The court argued that it was not necessary for counsel to read
the statements aloud in the jury's presence in order to refresh his memory.
However, in Gaines v. United States, a case in the same jurisdiction, the trial court
allowed the prosecutor to read his own witnesses' prior statements aloud in the presence of the
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jury for the purpose of refreshing their recollection.131 The Court of Appeals held that this was
error, even though the trial court carefully instructed the jury that the statements were not
evidence of the truth of their contents. According to the chief prosecutor in this case, prosecutors
do not as a matter of practice give witnesses copies of statements because that would enable
them to alter or embellish their testimony at trial.132
ii. In R v Richardson Case United Kingdom
British courts have generally allowed witnesses to obtain copies of their statements. In
the Richardson Case, the court held that in most cases and particularly where, as often happens,
there is a long interval between the alleged offence and the trial, the interests of justice are likely
to be best served and witnesses will be more fairly treated if, before giving evidence, they are
allowed to refresh their recollection by reference to their own statement.133 However, the Court
determined that witnesses should not be handed copies of their statements days or weeks before the trial
begins.134 The court in Richardson biggest worry was to prevent witnesses from comparing their

statements in circumstances where there are many witnesses to a case.135
The court in Richardson went further to state that, a request for a copy of a statement can
be met by allowing access and a sight of the statement rather than giving the witness a copy.136
However, the court agreed that in a case where the statement is long or complex supplying a
copy may be unavoidable.137
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On the other hand, prosecutors in British Courts can deny a witness a copy of his or her
statement if there are grounds to believe the request is made other than with the desire to give
evidence honestly and accurately.138

iii. South Africa
In South Africa, the common practice is that written statements obtained by the police
from possible witnesses, are privileged until after the final conclusion of the trial,139 and it is
known as “witness statement privilege”.140 Although the privilege belongs to the prosecutor and
he has the discretion to waive it, there are certain circumstances in which the prosecutor must
abandon the privilege, for example, where the written statement is used to refresh the memory of
the prosecution witness in the witness-box.141
In determine what constitutes a privileged witness statement, S v. Mayo ruled that a
policeman’s pocket book is not a privileged document, unless the relevant entries can be
classified as falling under witness statement privilege, that is, where it forms part of the
prosecution’s brief. 142
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An accused that has made a statement to the police is prior to and during his trial, entitled to a
copy of this statement.143 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s. 335. Section 29(8) of the
Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 creates an exception in this regard and denies an accused pretrial access to a copy of a statement made during his detention in terms of section 29 of the aforementioned Act. 144
iii. India
Like in many common law jurisdictions, the practice in India is no different. Article 159 of the
India Evidence Act states that, witnesses may request to see copies of their statements in order to
help refresh their memory with the permission of the court.145 Therefore it is at the sole
discretion of the court that this request can be granted.
v. Nigeria
Nigeria, like many other commonwealth countries, do permit witnesses to request a copy
of their statement. Article 216 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure in Nigeria states that, a
witness may, while under examination, see copies of any past statements made by himself at the
time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or afterwards that the court considers
it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory.146
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vi. Hongkong
The common-law practice that a witness may request to see copies of his statement was
first stated in the 1966 Supreme Court case R v. Lau Pak Ngam.147 The court held that a witness
may request to obtain copies of his statements because if a witness is deprived of this
opportunity, his testimony in the witness box becomes more a test of memory than
truthfulness.148
vii.. Australia
As established in common-law jurisdictions, the practice of how and when witnesses can
obtain copies of their statements is no different in Australia. Section 32 of the 1995 Evidence Act
of Australia states that; (1) A witness must not, in the course of giving evidence, use a document
to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion unless the court gives leave. (2)
Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give
leave, it is to take into account: (a) whether the witness will be able to recall the fact or opinion
adequately without using the document; and (b) whether so much of the document as the witness
proposes to use is, or is a copy of, a document that: (i) was written or made by the witness when
the events recorded in it were fresh in his or her memory; or (ii) was, at such a time, found by the
witness to be accurate.149
However, in Australia, if a witness has, while giving evidence, used a document to try to
revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion, the witness may, with the leave of the court,
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read aloud, as part of his or her evidence, so much of the document as relates to that fact or
opinion.150
viii.. Singapore
In Singapore, like in other common-law countries, witnesses are allowed to see copies of
their statements to help refresh their memory. Article I61 of the Evidence Act of Singapore states
as follows; (1) A witness may while under examination refresh his memory by referring to any
writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so
soon afterwards that the court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his
memory.151 In addition , the witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other
person and read by the witness within the time mentioned in subsection if, when he read it, he
knew it to be correct.152 Also, the rules of evidence in Singapore allow the witness, with the
permission of the court, to refer to a copy of any document if the court is satisfied that there is
sufficient reason for the non-production of the original.153 Unlike in other common-law courts,
the Singapore rules of evidence also specify that an expert witness can refresh his memory by
requesting to see a copy of his statement and professional treatises as well.154
V.

Conclusion
The fact that international tribunals do not have statutes addressing how witnesses can

request copies of their statements makes it difficult for some witnesses to obtain such statements
as seen in the ICC’s Lubanga case. However, the fact that a majority of witnesses in these
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tribunals have been able to obtain copies of their statements through “witness proofing” should
be commended. Because “witness proofing” seem to have been well accepted in the early ad-hoc
tribunals, it would be helpful for tribunals to enact statutes specifically dealing with “witness
proofing” or statutes dealing with how and when witnesses can obtain copies of their statements.
Without such clarifications, international tribunals will continue to face difficulties on how to
handle this issue.
While it seems to be the practice on common-law tribunals such as the ICTY, ICTR and
SCSL that witnesses are allowed to see their statements through witness proofing, the practice in
national jurisdictions varies from one country to another. In general, courts in the United States,
United Kingdom and other common-law-leaning countries have held that witnesses may see
copies of theirs statements if the statement is being used to refresh their memories.
In conclusion, it can safely be assumed that all the stakeholders in the international criminal
Law process will have little difficulty accepting the importance of these aims and objectives. The
difficulty is how best to craft practices to ensure that they are achieved without importing
irregularity or unfairness into the process.
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